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Author 



Title 



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16—47372-2 OPO 




THE OTIIEE SIDE 



AS \ ii;\\ III nv 



GENERALS GRANT. SHERMAN, 



ANT) 



OTIFER DISTINGUISHED OFFICERS 



BRING 



A DEFENCE OF HIS CAMl'AHJX INTO N. E. MISSISSITI'I IN 
■PHE YEAR 1864, 

/ 

/ 

Dv S. D. STURGIS, 
liKiAKT Major CiEnerat. U. S. Akmv. m • 



WASIITXCTON, I) < 
1SS2. 



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n IK ( rnwAi side 



AS \IK\VKli IIV 



GENERALS GRANT. SHERMAN 



AND 



Ol IIKl! |)ISTIN(a ISIIEI) OFFICERS 



A DKFKXCE OF HIS CAMIWKIN INTO N. E. MISSISSI IM'I IN 
llIK YEAR 1S64, 



Hv S. D. srURCIS, 
I'.KiAp.T Major (ir.NKRAi. U. S. Army. 



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if^SHlNO"^'^'* 



WASIlIXCiroN". D. C. : 
1882. 



\Vashin.;t(.n, 1). C, Feb. 24, 1882. 

To Gen. U. C\ Dki m, 

.{({niUint (icncnil of llif Armi/. Washmgioiu D. C. 

(ii-NKiiAi. : Oil till- :Ust of May, 1864, at the instance of 
the Major (ieneial coinniandinu- the Military Division of the 
Missouri, I *vas phiced in eoniniand of an ex}>edition then 
being organized and concentrated at Lafayette, Tennessee, 
by the Major (Jeneral conunanding the District of West 
Tennessee, foi- the [)ur[tose of operating against the rebel 
forces under Fori'est, in Northeast Mississippi, with a view- 
to creating a diversion in favor of Uen. Sherman's Army 
then engaged in tht' canijiaigii against Atlanta. My com- 
mand was composed ofaltout 8,000 men — infantry, cavalry, 
and artillery. My instructions were to proceed to Corinth, 
Miss., by way of Salem and Ruckerville: capture any force 
tiuit might he there, then proceed south, destroying the 
Mobile and Ohio iJailroad to Tui)elo, Okolona, and as far as 
possible towanl Macon and Columbus, with a portion of my 
force; thence to Grenada and back to Meniphis. On the 
2d of June I arrived at Lafayette, assumed command of the 
troops, and at oucv j)roceeded on that service, but owing to 
heavy rains and l)ad roads leading through a low, wooded 
country, and to tlu' fact that my command was necessarily 
encumbered with some 200 wagons, our progress was slow, 
notwithstanding every exertion was nuulc by me to expe- 
dite the march. We wei'c compel led to carry our supplies, 
as the country to be traversed was totally destitute of sup- 
plies for either man or beast. For a distance of some 75 or 
100 miles (1 cannot sjieak detinitely as to the exact distance 
at this late date) our line of march lay along a narrow and 
almost impracticable road. 

Then, too. 1 was ordered to strike a point 200 miles dis- 
tant, which could oid\- be readied bv a lona" and tedi(nis 



march, and at which, the enemy having the interior line and 
railway communication, could concentrate a force superior 
to mine in a few hours. The inhahitants of the country 
through which we passed were, of course, all hostile — men, 
women, and children — so that it was utterl}' impossible to 
glean any reliable information from them regarding the 
enemy or his movements; whilst, on the other hand, every 
hamlet furnished its ready and swift messenger to the enemy 
with news of our approach, and kept him thoroughly posted 
as to our movements from the moment my command took 
up its line of march. On the tenth day out the enemy was 
encountered at Brice's Cross-roads, about 23 miles from 
Kipley and (some) six miles from Guntown. I shall here 
quote from my official report of this expedition, made to the 
Assistant Adjutant General of the District of West Ten- 
nessee, dated June 24, 1864 : 

"At Ripley (three days before the battle) it became a se- 
ious question in my mind as to whether or not I should 
proceed further. The rain still fell in torrents — the artil- 
lery' and wagons were literally mired down, and the starved 
and exhausted animals could with difficulty drag them along. 
Under these circumstances I called together my division 
commanders and placed before them my views of our situa- 
tion. At this interview one brigade commander (Colonel 
Iloge, of the 113th Illinois,) and two members of my staff, 
were incidentally present also. I called attention to the 
great delay we had undergone on account of the condition 
of the roads and the exhausted condition of our animals — 
the great probability that the enemy would avail himself of 
the time thus afforded to concentrate an overwhelming force 
against us, and the utter hopelessness of saving our train or 
artillery in case of defeat, on account of the narrowness and 
general bad condition of the roads, and the impossibility of 
procuring supplies of forage for the animals. All agreed 
with me in the probable consequences of defeat. Some 
thought our only safety lay in retracing our steps and aband- 
oning the expedition. It was urged, however, and with 
some propriety, too, that inasmuch as I had abandoned a 
similar expedition only a few weeks before, and given as 



5 



iiiv reason for ^^o (loin<i!; ' tlio utter and entii'e destitution of 
till' eountrv/and that, in the face of this, we were ao;ain sent 
throut^h tlie same eountry, it would ])e ruinous on all sides 
to I'etuni without nieetinu- the enemy. Moreover, from all 
the iiitorniatiim (Jeneral Washburne (commanding the dis- 
trict) had ae(|uired, there eould be no considerable force in 
our front, :ind all my iidbrmation led mo to the same con- 
clusion. To hi' sure, my information was exceedingly 
meagre and unsatisfactory ; and, had 1 returned, I would 
have been wholly unable to ])resent any facts to justify my 
course or to show why the expedition might not have been 
successfully carried forward. All T could have presented 
would havi' been my conjectures as to what the enemy w(Mild 
naturally do under the circumstances, and these would have 
availed but litile against the idea that' the enemy was scat- 
tered and luul no considerable force; in our front.' Under 
these circumstances, and with a sad foreboding of the eon- 
se(|uences, 1 determined to move forward — keei)ing my 
force as compact as possible and ready for action at all 
times — hoping that we might succeed, and feeling that if 
we should not, still oui" loss might be insigniiicant m com- 
|>arison with the great benefit that nnght thus accrue to 
Cienei'al Sherman, by the depletion of Johnston's army to so 
large an extent. On the evening of the 8th, one day beyond 
Uiplcy, I asscmbh'd the comman<lers of infantry brigades at 
till' licadfpKirters of Colonel McMillen, and cautionecl them 
as to the necessity of eiifoi'cing rigid discipline in their 
( am]>s — k<.'epijig their troops always in hand and ready to 
act on a moments notice —that it was impossible to gain any 
accurate or reliable iidbrmation of the enemy, and that it 
iiehooved us to move and act as though in his presence — 
that We wei-e now wlici'e We might iMicounter him at any 
moment, and that \\c must, under no cii-cumstances, allow 
ourselves to be suiprised. On the morning of the 10th 
the cavalry marched at liall' past 5 o'cloc-k — the intantry 
at 7 — thus allowing the iidantry to follow immediately 
in rear of the i-avalry — as it would taki' the cavalry a full 
h(Mir and a half to cU-ar their camp. Tlu' habitual order of 
march was as t'ollows, \i/. : cavalry, with its artillery, in ad- 
\anet' : infantry, with its artillei-y, next: and lastly the suji- 
ply tiain, guarclrd by the rear brigade, with one of its regi- 
ments at the hea<l, on*- in the middU', and one, with a sectic^n 
of artillery — in the rear. ()n ////> morning, I had preceded 



6 

tlie head of the infantry cohiinn, and arrived at a point some 
iive miles fi-om camp, where I found an unusually bad place 
in the road, and one that would require considerable time 
and labor to i-ender practicable. Whilst halted here to await 
the head of the column, I received a message from General 
Grierson that he had encountered a portion of the enemy's 
cavalry. In a few minutes more, I received another mes- 
sage from him, saying the enemy numbered some 600, and 
was on the Baldwin road ; that he was, himself, at Brice's 
cross-roads, and that he had a good position, and would hold 
it. He was then dii'ccted to leave GOO or 700 cavalry at the 
cross-roads, to precede the infantry on its march towards 
Guntown ; and, with the remainder of his force, to drive 
the enem}' towards Baldwin, and then rejoin the main body 
by way of the line of the railroad, as I did not intend being 
drawn from my main purpose. Colonel McMillen arrived 
at this time, and I rode forward toward the cross-roads. 
Before proceeding tai-, however, I sent a staff officer back, 
directing Colonel McMillen to move up his advanced l)rig- 
ade as rapidly as posssible, without distressing his troops. 
When I reached the cross-roads, I found nearly all the cav- 
alry engaged, and the battle growing warm, but noartilleiy 
had yet opened on either side. We had four pieces of artil- 
lery at the cross-roads, l)ut they had not lieen placed in po- 
sition, owing to the dense woods on all sides, and the 
apparent impossibility, of using them to advantage. Finding 
that our troops were being hotly pressed, I ordered one 
section to open on the enemy's i-eserves. The enemy's 
artillery soon replied, and with great accuracy — every shell 
bursting over and in the immediate vicinitj' of our guns. * * 
About half-past one o'clock, the infantry began to arrive. 
Colonel Hoge's brigade was the tirst to reach the Held, and 
was placed in position by Colonel McMillen, when the enemy 
was driven a little. General Grierson ret^uested authority 
to withdraw the cavalry, as it was exhausted, and well-nigh 
out of ammunition. This I authorized, as soon as sufficient 
infantry were in position to permit it, and he was directed 
to reorganize his command in the rear, and liold it ready to 
operate on the flanks. In the meantime, I had ordered a 
section of artillery to l)e placed in position some three or 
four hundred yards in the rear, for the purpose of opposing 
any attempt of the enemy to turn our left tiank. I now 
went to this point to see that my orders had been executed, 



aii<l also to ,i(iv(.' (lirt'ctioiis lor tlu' iiiaiiai;i'iin'iit and ))rotc'C- 
tioii of the wagon train. Whilst liei'c, the wagon train, 
which had boLMi re[iort(-'(l still a mile and a halt" in I'ear, 
arrived. 

" The pi't'ssnre on the right ot" the line was now becom- 
ing great, and <ien. (irierson was directed to send u por- 
tion ot his cavalry to that point. At this time I received a 
nu'ssage from Col. Iloge that he was satisfied tliat the move- 
ment on the right was a ti-int, and that the real attack was 
being made on tlie left, .\notlier section of artillery was 
tlien placed in position a littlr to the rear, but bearing on 
the left of our main line, and a portion of the cavalry was 
thrown out as skirmishers. The cavalry which had been 
sent to the extreme right began to give away, and at 
the same time the enemy began to aj)pear in force in rear 
of the extreme left, while Col. McMillen required reinforce- 
ments in the centre. 1 now endeavored to get hold of the 
colored brigade whirl) toniieil the guai'd to tlu; train. Whilst 
traveling the short distance to where the head of the !)rigade 
should be found, the main line began to give away at various 
j)oints. Order soon ga\f way to confusion and confusion to 
panic. I sent an aide-de-camp to Col. McMillen, informing 
him that f was unable to furnish him any additional assist- 
ance, and that he must do all in his power with what he had, 
to hold his position until I coidd form a line to protect his 
retreat. On reaching the head of the supply train, J.ieut. 
Col. Hesse was directed to phu-e in position, in a wood, the 
first regiment of colored troops I found. This was done, 
and it is due to these troops to say that they held their 
ground well, and rendered valuable aid to Col. McMillen, 
who was soon after comi)elled to withdraw from his original 
line and take upa new j»osition in the rear, it was 5 o'clock 
ji. ni. For M.-ven hours tlu'se gallant men held their j)Osi- 
tion against o\erwiielming nutubers, but at last, overpowered 
and exhausted, they were compelled to abandon, not only the 
field, but many of their gallant comrades who had fallen, to 
the mercy of the enemy. Kveryw here the army now drifted 
to the rear, and was soon altogether beyond control. I re- 
i|uested <Jen. (irierson to accompany me and to aid in 
checking the fleeing column, and establishing a new line. 
By dint of entreaty and force, and the aid of several otH- 
cers whom I called to n^y assistance, we at length succeeded 
in checking some l.iino men and establishinu' a line, of 



wliicli Col. Wilkiiis, of Minnesota, was placcul in charge. 
About this time it was reported to me that Col. McMillen 
was driving the enemy. I placed little faith in this report, 
yet disseminated it freely for the good effect it might pro- 
duce on the troops. In a few minutes, however, that gal- 
lant officer, sad and disheartened, arrived, and reported his 
line broken and in confusion. The new line under Col. 
Wilkins also gave way soon after, and it was now impossi- 
ble to exercise any further control. The road became 
crowded and jammed with troops — the wagons and artillery 
sinking into the deep mud, became inextricable, and added 
to the general confusion which everywhere prevailed. No 
power could now check or control the panic-stricken mass 
as it swept toward the rear. '■' " * * 

"About 10 o'clock p. m. I reached Stubb's, where I found 
Col. Winslow's brigade. I informed him that his was the 
only organized body of men I had been able to find, and 
requested him to add to his own every possible force he 
could rally as they passed, and take charge of the rear — re- 
maining in position until all should have passed. I also 
informed him that on account of the extreme darkness of 
the night and the wretched condition of the roads, I had 
little hope of saving anything more than the troops, and 
directed him, therefore, to destroy all wagons and artillery 
which he might find blocking up the road and preventing 
the passage of the men. In this way some 200 wagons and 
14 pieces of artillery were lost — many of the wagons being- 
burned and the artillery spiked and otherwise mutilated. 
The mules and horses were brought away. By 7 a. m. of 
the 11th we had organized at Ripley, and the army pre- 
sented a quite respectable appearance, and would have been 
able to accomplish an orderly retreat from that point but 
for the unfortunate circumstance that the cartridge boxes 
were well nigh exhausted. At 7 o'clock the column was 
again put in motion on the Salem road. 
"" The enemy pressed heavily on the rear, and there was 
^iJk * iiothing left but to keep in motion so as to prevent the break- 
ing upof tlie rear and to pass all cross-roads before the 
enemy could reach them, as the command was in no condi- 
tion to offer determined resistance, whether attacked in front 
or in rear." * * * 



Ill tlii> adiiir I :iiii assailed and (.diai-ucMl with heiii-i' diiiiik 
and with ^jrossly ncglectinij,- my duty and tailing to properly 
nianagu the lorcos, and that I aiiandoned \r\y coniniand and 
sought socurity in Hight — in other words, accusing nie of 
druids'cniu'ss, cowardice, and inconipetency on that occasion. 
These false and lii)ellous imputations against my re[iutation 
and honor have heen industriously eirc-ulated in newspapers, 
and lia\e now assumed the torn; ol" a [)etition to the Senate 
and House of i;e[»resentatives of the United States, circu- 
lated hy one (i. A. (Ressner. It is stated in this petition 
that ujion my retui'ti to Memphis I was "required to appear 
hefore a court of in(|uiry convened by General C. C, AVash- 
huiMie, commanding the Department of West Tennessee — 
whicli court, alter cai'efuUy investigating Gen. Sturgis' con- 
duet as eommaiider of said e.xiiedition, fouiul him guiltv of 
druid<enness, eowardice, gross incompetency, and of con- 
duct unhecoming an officer and gentleman. This finding 
of the court was suhseijUently, in some way and hy some 
person oi- olllcer, we know not how or hy wlioui, sup- 
pressed." 

This is all a stupid falsehood, told with nudicious intent. 
No Court of In([uiry was appointed or inquired as stated. 
A Board of Investigation, liowever, was convened for the- 
ostensible purpose of investigating the causes of the disas- 
ter to tlie troops umler my comnuind. I was not, liowever, 
permitted to be present hefore this tribunal dui'ing its in- 
vestigation, except as a leifness. It was not a tribunal known 
to miiitai-y law : and whatever its findings and Judgment 
may have been they have not been made known to me, nor 
do I now know wiiat they were ; they cannot, therefore. 
l)ropei-ly be held to aft'ct't me. Nevertheless, what te^^aat 
to have been detaclied portions of that record were circulated 
to injure and defame me. 

Immediately on my return to Memjthis \ demanded of 
the General Commanding the District the appointment of a 
•2 



M 



't/V 



10 

Court of Inquiry to examine into the matter; Ijut Gen. 
Waslibunie, then commanding tlie District, informed me 
that he had not the power to grant me a Court of Inquiry, 
but wouhi forward my application to Department Head- 
quarters. No Court of Inquiry having been appointed 
under tliis request, on the 17th of August, 1864, I addressed 
Department Headquarters on the subject, urging the ap- 
pointment of a C-ourt of Inquiry. On the l:itli January, 
1865, 1 addressed the Adjutant General of the Army on the 
same subject. The following is a cop\' of that letter: 

CoviN(rroN, Ky., Jan. 12, 1865. 

Ad.tutant General of thh Army, 

Washm;iUm, D. C. 

Sir : As a great many malicious misrepresentations have 
been spread before the country in regard to my conduct ot 
the campaign in JN^ortheast Mississippi last summer, by 
which I have l>een placed in a false and injurious light be- 
fore the people and the Government, I would respectfully 
ask that an opportunity be aftbrded me of defending n-.yself 
before a Court of In(|uir\-, composed of intelligent officers 
of experience. In case it sliouhl. not -be deemed practicable 
to order such a court at this time, I would respectfully ask 
that I be ordered to report to the Hon. Secretary of War, 
in order that I may be enabled to place myself right, at 
least, before the Government. I have thus ftir and for 
a long time borne quietly, and with as much patience 
as I could command, tlie thousand calumnies which have 
been heaped upon my head, and which (unintentionally 
I am sure) have received more or less contirrnation by 
the course which the War Department has been pleased to 
adopt toward me; but I have never abandoned the hope 
{lTm% just Government — and one to whose interest I have 
devoted over twenty-one of the best years of my life — 
would, sooner or later, afford me that liearing which is due 
to' my long and faithful services — due to those friends who 
have stood by me through evil as well as through good re- 
port — due to the truth of history — and due, in an eminent 
degree, to abstract justice itself. 



11 

I have the honor to he, sir, veiT rcspecttully, your obedi- 
t'Ut servant, 

(Signed,) S. 1). Stukuis, 

Brigadier General. 
Oftieial f(i|iy. 

U.' ('. hm.M, 

^[djalant (iinir<d. 
A. G. (K, Januari/ I'i, 1881. 

On the llJth of April, 18(J."), I addressed a letter to Gen. 
Grant, from wiiieh the following are extracts, viz. : 

C'ovixcTdX, Ky., April 16, 1865. 

(lENEiLM-: 1 t-nelose a letter whicli I had jtrepared on the 
day previous to thi' tireadful assassination of the President, 
l)Ut whieii, foi'tunately, 1 ha<l not mailed when the sad news 
arrived. I took the liberty of addressing it to the President 
direct, in adtlition to the reasons therein assigned, because I 
was doubtful of a letter reaching i/(>>/. * I simply 

eiiclosi' the accomjjanying letter as a kind of preface to this 
one. * '■'- My present rank I never asked for, nor did 

any of my friends; but it was bestowed Uj>on me by the 
Tresident, as he was kind enough to say, " for services ren- 
dei'ed at the battle of Wilson's (,'i-eek,'' and on that at-- 
count is was made to date from the lOth of August, 1861, 
the (kite of that battle. 

You know me well enough to know that 1 take no pride 
in the ei-lat of rank, nor do 1 desire to retain it one moment 
after it ceases to l>e useful to the ( ioNernnieut ; I /"/'"( a pi'ide 
in returning to the regular army (when 1 do return) with 
an unsullied reputation. I liari a pride in retaining the re- 
spect of my wife and ehildi'en. Before the war, 
I will venture to say. my record would compare favorably 
with that of any officer of my (then) rank. At the breaking 
out ot" the war, and when nearly all tiie jtosts in Texas were 
surri'ndered to the enemy, I rescued my troops and marched 
them in safety to Fort fA'avenworth. The jtart I took in 
Missouri, is known to you already. (Jeiieral Tope says, in 
his report of tiie batth' of Hull-linn, that my '• services were 
ilesei'ving of sp, ,i'd mention. \e.. \c."' .Vt South Mountain 
my division |ilayed an imporiani jiaiM in the capture of the 
"Crest." At .\ntietam, ( u'ueral jiurnside had mv division 



12 

paraded for the purpose of conveying- to it, General McClel- 
lan's thanks for the " valuable service it rendered in storm- 
ing and carrying the 'Bridge' on the left of the line." For 
my part in the battle of Fredricksburg, General Burnside 
asked the President, in person, for my advancement. My 
services in East Tennessee, are already known toj'ou. Now 
if the disaster in Mississippi could properly be laid to my 
charge, is all charity to be dried up ? are all previous ser- 
vices to count for nothing? But I claim that I am not re- 
sponsible for that disaster. * * Surely the Government 
has no vengeance to wreak on so humble an individual as 
myself! Then why not hear me? My traducers and those 
who delight in seeing honest men overthrown, have received 
a hearing, and why not hear what I mny have to say in my 
vindication? If I express myself strongly, General, I trust 
you will not attribute it to lack of proper respect, but to the 
importance (at least to me) of the subject ; for if I should be 
mustered back to my regiment unheard, my chances for a 
hearing will be virtually destroyed, and a deep and grievous 
injury will have been inflicted upon me which can never be 
corrected. * * * 

Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
[Signed.] S. D. Sturgis, 

Brigadier General. 

The foregoing will suflice, I trust, to show the reckless- 
ness with which these assaults were made and scattered 
broadcast over the country, charging me with evading and 
" shirking investigations " and " never having even made a 
report of my campaign," &c. It will also show that I have 
not failed to urge on every practicable occasion the thorough 
investigation of the subject, believing that when the facts 
could be known and understood they would fully vindicate 
me. 

But it is upon the testimony of my division and brigade 
commanders and the oflicers of my staff that I rely chiefly 
for my vindication against these calumnious aspersions. 
Brigadier General B. H. Grierson, commanding my cavalry 
division, in a letter dated June 25, 1864, says : " I expressed 
to you at Ripley, in presence of Col. McMillen and Col. 



13 

IIogL', thill to udviincL' bevoiul that jtoiiit, under tlic circum- 
stances, would, in my opinion, lead to disaster. The com- 
mand was encumhered with a large train. Tlie roads were 
in very bad comlition, and the movement toward the ene- 
my's line of communication had been so slow as to give him 
ample time to learn our strength and concentrate bis forces. 
Since returning from the expedition I have beard reports to 
the etiect that you were drunk on the Held of battle, and I 
take pleasure in saying that [ kiioic them to be false. Neither 
then, nor during the expedition, did I see in you the least 
sign of any use of intoxicating liquor. No other charges of 
personal misconduct have come to my knowledge, and I be- 
lieve that you used your best endeavor to obey the orders 
of your superior aiid accomplish the objects of the expedi- 
tion." 

Col. W . L. McMillcn, Hijth <)liio vol. infantry, command- 
ing thi' infanti-y division of my command, says, in a letter 
dated dune 24, 18(14 : " The expedition consisted of 5,000 
infantry and 8,000 cavalry, with a train of more than 200 
wagons, making some 4,600 animals to be subsisted. Ra- 
tions for the men were transported in wagons, but after 
U-aving Lafayette y(ui were entirely dependent upon the 
country for forage. The line of nuirch was through a 
country devastated by tlu- war and containing little or no 
forage, remlering it extremely ditlieult, and for the greater 
portion of the time impossible, to maintain the animals in a 
serviceable condition. The roads were narrow, leading 
through dense forests and over streams rendered almost im- 
passable by the iieavy rains which fell daily from the time 
we left Memphis until our i-etnrn. The country was new 
to yon, and I know the difficulty you constantly encountered 
in obtainiuiT information cojicernini*; roads and crossings. 
Ahuost every man and woiuan along the line of march is 
an enemy eager to communicati- information ot our force 
and movements. Laltorim;- under all these disadvantaiies 



14 

you moved against an enemy who possessed long lines of 
railroad with which to concentrate troops and supplies at 
any point you might threaten. Either you were obliged to 
abandon the object of the expedition before reaching the 
immediate presence of the enemy, or overpower him with 
that portion of your army which could be spared from guard- 
ing the long line of wagons. The latter you attempted and 
failed in from the simple fact that the enemy developed a 
heavier force than you could bring into action. The en- 
gagement itself was, so far as I know, managed as well as 
circumstances would permit — was fought with spirit — even 
desperation — and with no loss of consequencein material and 
men (except the killed and wounded). I have never known 
greater, ettbrts to be made by any commanding olMcer to 
conduct a column of troops in an orderly and compact man- 
ner than was made by you. * * * On the day of the 
battle the column was as well closed up as the nature of the 
road over which we were moving would permit, and the 
troops were put in position as fast as they could come up. 
* * * Yoj^, were sent through this country encumbered 
with a heavy train, without, so far as I know, discretionary- 
powers, and you went to meet the disaster your better judg- 
ment told you was imminent should you encounter the enemy 
in force beyond liipley. As to the slanderous charges with 
wliich the country is being flooded concerning you per- 
sonally, they are simply false and beneath your notice or 
mine." 



Colonel Alexander Wilkins, !)th Minn. Vols., command- 
ing the 1st Infantry Brigade, in adetter dated June 22, 1864, 
writes to the same effect, and so does Col, Joseph Karje, 2d 
]*^ew Jersey Cavalry, (now Professor in the College of New 
Jersey, at Princeton,) and Col. Geo. E. Waring, 4th Mo. 
Cavalry, commanding 1st Brigade Cavalry, in letters dated 
respectively, June 18, and 23, 1861. 



15 

Till' tollowiiii:- letter, of whose existence I was not awai'e' 
until this mornini:-. wlien it was sent nie iVoin the tiles of the 
War DepartMieiit, will ex[tlain itself: hut it may he well to 
ohserve tliat it was written nearly a year and a half after the 
Mississippi eanipaign, so that the Lieutenant (Jeneral had 
had ample time to familiarize himself with the merits of that 
e:im]iaii;n : and written, too, without solicitation on my part : 

Washington, Od. 14,1865. 
IIiiN. !•;. M. Stanton, 

Srcni'tn/ of War. 
I would respectfully recommend the promotion of IJrevet 
Col. S. J). Sturi,^is, to the rank of Brijjadier General hy 
I)revet. Notwithstandinii,- his failure at Guntown, Miss., 
1 know him to l)e a j^ood jind etticient otlicer — far ahove the 
averaire of our cavalry colonels. From the heixinning- of 
the war he lias sutt'ered from having served in .Ivi\nsas and 

coming in contact with and op[)osition to * * , Senator 

|>rohal)ly in tlie lead. 

(Signed.) V . S. Grant, 

Jjieiit. GeiieraL 

[Otheiiil. ] 

K. ( ". hiiiM, At/'/Nfanf General. 

I have received numy letters from otticers who [lartiei- 
pated in that campaign, expressing their readiness and glad- 
ness to come forward and vindicate my honor and reputa- 
tion, and estahlish tiie talsity of the lihellous imputations 
puhlished and circulated hy the malicious person, Gessncr, 
and moi'c i'sj)ecially jnihlished in the '' Toledo Bl((ile." 

The newspapers, however, are not the medium tlirough 
which I can hope to vindicate my military record againstthese 
irri'sponsihie defamers of my good name: and, therefore, I 
have the honor to renew my application for a court of in- 
<juiry to examine into tlic character of these imputations, 
and to ask that the court be ordere<] to give an opinion on 
the merits. 

I am. sir. very ri'spect fully, &c., 

S. D. SxuRfJis, 
Brevet Major General, U. S. A. 



16 

Fehrmry 28, 1882. 
The following endorsement of the General of the Army 
upon the foregoing paper is just received, viz.: 

Headquarters of the Army, 
Adjutant General's Office, 

Washington, D. C.,Feb. 28, 1882. 
Col. S. D. Siurgis, Seventh Cavalry, 

Soldiers' Home, near Washingtov, I). C: 

Sir : I have laid before the General of the Army your 
letter of the 24tli instant, renewing your application for a 
Court of Inquiry to examine into certain allegations made 
in regard to your conduct on the expedition to Northeast 
Mississippi, in 1864. 

The General instructs me to inform you that he does not 
think a Court of Inquiry at this late day at all necessary, 
as your record of service in the Array is full from 1846 to 
date, and no charges or imputations from any authorized 
source exist against you. The matters complained of are 
mere topics of camp rumor, reproduced by the newspapers, 
but as your friends may desire a general denial on your 
part. Gen. Sherman has no objection to your printing and 
circulating your letter of the 24th instant. 
Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
(Signed,) " "^ R. C. Drum, 

Adjutant General. 



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